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Duany: Constitutional Law: The Consideration of Pre-Birth Conduct in the

CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE CONSIDERATION
OF PRE-BIRTH CONDUCT IN THE
DETERMINATION OF ABANDONMENT
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995)
Tracy A. Duany*
Petitioner, an unwed father,' contested a motion to waive his consent
to respondents' adoption of his natural child.' Respondents argued that
petitioner abandoned the child by emotionally abusing the mother and
failing to provide her with adequate financial and emotional support
during her pregnancy.3 Petitioner contended that while he paid for half
of the couple's joint living expenses,4 he was unable to afford prenatal
care.5 Still, petitioner attended a doctor visit with the mother, bought a

* This case comment is dedicated to my parents, Tony and Trudy Duany, for their
continuing love and support. Special thanks to the members and staff of the FloridaLaw Review
for their countless hours of work and dedication.
1. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 963 (Fla. 1995) [hereinafter Baby
E.A.W.].
2. See id. Respondents, the prospective adoptive parents, id. at 968 app., filed a motion
during the adoption proceedings to waive petitioner's, the birth father, consent to the adoption.
Id. at 971. Petitioner filed a challenge to the motion soon after the child's birth. Id. at 978.
3. See id. at 964. The birth mother testified that petitioner once grabbed and shook her,
then spit on her for using his razor. Id. She also testified that petitioner called her names,
verbally abused her, and had a drinking problem. Id. Further, when she was considering
adoption, petitioner told her to " 'do whatever you have to do.' " Id. Moreover, after she was
pregnant, petitioner resumed a sexual relationship while still living with the birth mother. Id. at
965. Not surprisingly, the birth mother's doctor testified that she was having trouble at home
during this time. Id. at 964.
4. Id. The birth mother's testimony contradicts the petitioner's contention that he
provided full support. Id. The couple lived together for only the first six months of the
pregnancy. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 923-24 (4th DCA 1994) (en banc),
affid, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) [hereinafter E.A.W.]. During the first few months, the birth
mother was employed and paying her own expenses. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 964. Even after
an accident left her unable to work, she continued to pay her own way. Id. at 969 app. "She
bought food with food stamps and gave a government aid check to [petitioner] for her
expenses." Id. at 964. This covered her half of the rent and other expenses. See id. at 969 app.
After the birth mother moved out, petitioner did not provide her with financial support. Id. at
964.
5. E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 942. Even assuming the petitioner maintained the highest level
of earnings supported by evidence, $400 per week, the couple's combined income level qualified
them for Medicaid. Id. at 941-42 app. Consequently, during the period of joint residency, the
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crib for the child, and promptly opposed the adoption before the child
was born.6 Finding the evidence of abandonment insufficient, the trial
court denied respondents' motion. Upon rehearing, appellant introduced
new evidence disclosing that petitioner had a criminal past.8 The trial
court reversed its decision, finding clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment. 9

On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's finding,'" and declared that evidence regarding emotional
support should not be used when determining abandonment." After
rehearing en banc, the district court reversed the decision," and
certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court to determine whether
a father's lack of emotional support of the mother during pregnancy
could be considered as evidence of abandonment.' 3 Approving the
birth mother never asked petitioner to help her find health care. Id. at 941 app.
6. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 964-65. The birth mother testified that petitioner was an
'ice cube' " at the doctor visit. Id. at 964. In contrast, petitioner contended that "[h]e was
overjoyed about becoming a father." Id. Further, when contacted by the attorney intermediary,
petitioner immediately sought legal representation. Id. at 964-65. The instant court noted that
the petitioner bought the crib with his mother's money. Id. at 964. Yet, it opined that had the
attorney-intermediary not contacted him, petitioner's passive stance probably would have
continued. Id. at 965.
7. E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 919.
8. Id. at 944-45 app. The trial court granted the rehearing because the prospective
adoptive child had not been represented in the initial trial. Id. at 944 app. However, the trial
court granted the motion reluctantly, still believing that its original finding of no abandonment
was appropriate. Id. The new evidence presented at rehearing revealed that, in 1977, petitioner
was convicted for burglary and sexual battery. Id. at 945 app. Petitioner also was arrested for
sexual battery in 1985, but was acquitted. Id. Yet, normally evidence of this character may have
been relevant only to the best interests of the child. See id. at 945 n.9 app.
9. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 963. The trial court found the evidence clear and
convincing that the father did not demonstrate that he did not abandon the child. Id. at 971 app.
10. Id. at 965. A three-judge panel decided two to one that petitioner did not abandon the
child. Id. at 963.
11. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 949 app.
12. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 963. The court found abandonment by a decision of six
to five. Id.
13. Id. The question the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified to the Florida Supreme
Court inquired:
In making a determination of abandonment as defined by section 63.032(14),
Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), may a trial court properly consider lack of emotional
support and/or emotional abuse of the father toward the mother during pregnancy
as a factor in evaluating the "conduct of the father towards the child during the
pregnancy."
Id. The Florida Supreme Court noted that the certified question misquoted § 63.032(14). Id. It
then adjusted the question to correctly reflect that the statute allows a court to consider the
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district court's finding of abandonment, the Florida Supreme Court
answered in the affirmative and HELD, that a trial court may consider
a father's lack of emotional support and emotional abuse of the mother
when determining whether he had prenatally abandoned his child. 4
The Florida Supreme Court is not alone in struggling with questions
regarding the termination of parental rights. In recent years, the United
States Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional rights involved
in the parent-child relationship.15 In Santosky v. Kramer,6 the Court
addressed the constitutionality of a statute which allowed the State to
terminate the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding that
the child had been permanently neglected.17 The statute required only
a " 'fair preponderance of the evidence' " to support such a finding."
The State argued that the statute furthered the State's interests in
preserving and promoting the welfare of children and reducing the cost
and burden of proceedings to terminate parental rights. 9
On review, the Court held that due process required the State to
support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence before
it severed the rights of parents in their natural children." The Court
reasoned that the private interests of the natural parents in their children
were commanding, and the countervailing state interests were slight in
comparison. 1 Furthermore, the Court recognized that raising the
standard of proof may result in an overall reduction of inappropriate
terminations because the higher standard will emphasize the gravity of
parental rights termination proceedings to the factfinder 2 By making
it more difficult to strip parental rights in one's natural children, the
father's conduct toward the mother, not the child. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (Supp.
1992)). The Court claimed jurisdiction pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). Id.
14. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
15. See, e.g., Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality:
Gender-Neutralityand the Perpetuationof Patriarchy,95 COLuM. L. REV. 60,70 (1995). Before
the Supreme Court decisions, common law dictated that a man had absolutely no legal
relationship with children he sired out of wedlock. Id. at 67. However, he had complete custodial
authority over children born of his wife. Id.
16. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
17. Id. at 747 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b.4.(d), 384-b.7.(a) (McKinney Supp.
1981-1982)).
18. Id. (quoting Family Court Act, N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts § 622 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1981-1982)).
19. See id. at 766.

20. Id. at 747-48.
21. See id. at 760. "A standard of proof more strict than preponderance of the evidence
is consistent with both [parent's and state's] interests." Id. at 766. Further, the State's interest
only arises on a clear showing that the natural family cannot or will not provide for the child.

Id. at 767.
22. Id. at 764-65 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
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Court recognized that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest
in the care, custody, and management of their children. 3
The Supreme Court clarified who possessed this fundamental liberty
interest in Lehr v. Robertson.4 Appellant was the putative father of a
child born out of wedlock. Two years after the child's birth, the
mother and her new husband entered an order of adoption. 6 The court
approved the adoption order without notifying appellant. 7 Unaware of
the adoption order and before it was final, appellant filed a paternity
petition in the same court.2 8 The issue before the Court was whether
the State could deny a putative father notice and an opportunity to be
heard in an adoption proceeding when the State was aware of his
interest in the child. 9
Affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court held that appellant had
not been denied due process." Instead, the Court found that he could
have guaranteed receipt of notice by entering his name in the State's
putative father registry.3' The Court declared that the father's mere
biological link to the child did not merit constitutional protection, but
rather offered the natural father an opportunity interest in developing a
relationship with his offspring. 2 In order to acquire protection under
the Due Process Clause, the Court announced that the father must come
forward to participate in the rearing of his child.33 Because the father
waited two years to get involved with his child, the Court concluded
that he had not acquired constitutional protection. 4 Thus, the Lehr
decision narrowed the class of constitutionally protected parents to

23. Id. at 758-59 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981)); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (recognizing that unwed fathers
have a protected liberty interest in raising their children).
24. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
25. Id. at 250.
26. Id.
27. Id. The order also provided for an unchallenged adoption of appellee's older daughter.
Id. at n.2.
28. Id. at 252. Five weeks prior to the adoption order, appellant filed a " 'visitation and
paternity petition' " in Westchester County Family Court. Id.
29. See id. at 250.
30. Id. at 265.
31. Id. at 264.
32. Id. at 261-62. The Court also said that by grasping the opportunity, a natural father
may enjoy the parent-child relationship and make significant contributions to the child's
development. Id. at 262. Moreover, the Court declared if the natural father does not exercise the
opportunity, the Federal Constitution does not force the State to consider what the father believes
are the best interests of the child. Id.
33. Id. at 261.
34. Id. at 262.
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include only those parents who have established a substantial relationship with their children.35
The Supreme Court of Florida took Lehr one step further in In re
Adoption of Doe.36 In Doe, an unwed father, although financially able,
failed to provide the mother of his child with meaningful financial or
emotional support during her pregnancy.37 With the father's knowledge,
the mother sought to place the child with adoptive parents.38 The father
did not oppose the adoption until after the child had been placed in an
adoptive home. 9 On review, the court addressed whether the father's
pre-birth conduct towards the mother was relevant to a finding of
abandonment.' The court held that by failing to provide pre-birth
assistance to the mother when he was financially able, the father
abandoned his child.4
According to Florida law, a court may waive a parent's consent to
adoption when it finds the parent abandoned the child.42 The court
stated that a finding of abandonment meant that a parent had not
provided the child with emotional and financial support.43 Further, the
court found that evidence regarding the parent's pre-birth conduct was
relevant because such evidence tended "to prove or disprove [the]
material facts bearing on abandonment."' The court also recognized
that evidence of the best interests of the child was not relevant unless
the child was legally available for adoption.45 Relying on Lehr, the

35. See id. at 261-62.
36. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989).
37. Id. at 742-43. The district court found that Doe earned $10,000 in commissions in one
month. In re Adoption of Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
38. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 743.
39. Id. After the mother signed the adoption papers, the father proposed to her, moved to
Florida, signed an acknowledgement of paternity and married her two months later. Id.
40. Id. at 745.
41. Id. at 749.
42. Id. at 745. The Court referred to FLA. STAT. § 63.072 which enumerates the persons
whose consent to an adoption may be waived by a court. Id. Section 63.072(1) provides that
such persons include: "A parent who has deserted a child without affording means of
identification or who has abandoned a child." FLA. STAT. § 63.072(1) (1995).
43. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 744. The court interpreted the meaning of abandonment under
Florida Statutes chapter 63. Id. At that time, chapter 63 did not contain a subsection defining
abandonment. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966. The court then recognized that the trial court
incorrectly relied on the chapter 39 definition in its determination that abandonment as a matter
of law could bnly occur after birth. See Doe, 543 So. 2d at 745. However, the court found that
even the reliance chapter 39 provided on testing communication with the child was not
conclusive. ld. Instead, the court found testing whether pre-birth conduct evaluation was relevant
to the child support issue to be the better approach. Id.
44. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 746.
45. Id. at 744 (citing In re Adoption of John Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 1978)).
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court reasoned that the pre-birth conduct of the father constituted a
failure to assume his parental responsibilities as required by Florida
law.46 As an additional basis for its decision, the court acknowledged
"the public policy interests of society in encouraging unwed fathers to
assume parental responsibilities. '47 Thus, the court determined that the
father had abandoned his child, and held that his consent to the adoption
was therefore unnecessary.48
After Doe, the Florida Legislature amended its adoption statute to
include a definition of abandonment. 49 The statute did not apply to
parents who were unable to provide support." In addition, the statute
required that the abandonment be willful." Further, section 63.032(14)
provided that "the court may consider the conduct of a father towards
the child's mother during her pregnancy" when determining whether the
father abandoned the child. Thus, Florida law has declared that the
pre-birth conduct of a father, as well as his conduct after the child is
born, is relevant when considering whether his parental rights should be
terminated.
In the instant case, the court concluded that section 63.032(14)
allowed a court to consider a father's lack of emotional support, in
addition to displays of abuse toward the mother during pregnancy, when
determining whether the father abandoned his child. 3 Looking at the
language of the statute, the instant court focused on the Legislature's use
of the term "conduct., 54 Because the term "conduct" generally connotes
behavior, the instant court concluded that the Legislature did not intend
to limit such conduct to financial support.5 Having found the statutory
language clear and unambiguous, the instant court did not resort to rules

46. Id. at 748-49. In interpreting Lehr, the court found the biological-relationship rights
inchoate. Id. at 748. Accordingly, they were not constitutionally significant until assumed by the
parent. Id.
47. Id. at 749. But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989) (discussing
that a natural father's liberty right in his child is overcome by the traditional family unit of
husband and wife).
48. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 749.
49. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966.
50. FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1993). The statute provides in relevant part: " 'Abandoned'
means a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, while being able, makes no
provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child, which
situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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of statutory interpretation. 6 Pursuant to section 63.032(14), the instant
court concluded that a father's lack of emotional support of the mother
during pregnancy could be considered when determining whether the
father had abandoned his child. 7
As a further basis for its holding, the instant court relied on the Doe
decision." The instant court acknowledged that Doe was primarily
concerned with financial support, but also recognized the Doe court's
statement that a finding of abandonment meant a parent had not
provided the child with adequate emotional and financial sustenance.5 9
Because the Legislature amended the abandonment definition after
Doe,60 the instant court found the Doe court's recognition of an
emotional sustenance element provided additional justification for
considering a father's emotional support of the mother during pregnancy
when determining whether parental rights.should be terminated.6
In light of Doe and the intent of the Legislature, the instant court
concluded that petitioner's conduct towards the mother during pregnancy
tended to prove abandonment of the child.62 In making this decision,
the instant court approved the trial court's disregard of best-interests
evidence as an inappropriate consideration. 6' Further, the instant court
found the evidence of lack of emotional and financial support to be
sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard because
it was of "sufficient weight to convince a trier of fact without hesitancy."' Thus, the instant court concluded that petitioner had waived his
right to consent to his natural child's adoption.65
This interpretation of section 63.032(14) ignores the Supreme Court's
holding in Lehr that unwed fathers have a constitutionally protected
opportunity interest in developing a relationship with their children.66
Because this opportunity interest protects petitioner's fundamental
liberty interest, the State must, at a minimum, allow him to exercise this
interest absent clear and convincing proof that he abandoned his
child.67 While a father's pre-birth conduct is relevant in making an
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
relevancy
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 965.
Id.
§ 63.032(14) added by 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 92-96, § 3.
Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 966. The court agreed that consideration of best-interests evidence lacks
unless the child was available for adoption for reasons other than abandonment. Id.
Id. at 967 (quoting In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994)).
See id.; Doe, 543 So. 2d at 747.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 976 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
FLA. STAT.
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abandonment determination under the Florida statute, it is only relevant
to the extent it demonstrates a willful abandonment of the child. 6' Lack
of emotional support of the mother before the child is born does not
tend to prove a willful abandonment of a child and would therefore be
irrelevant. 69 Thus, the use of pre-birth emotional support evidence in
the instant court's application of section 63.032(14) raises a due process
concern as to whether the father's opportunity interest in forming a
relationship with his child remained adequately protected.7"

This due process concern resurfaces through an analysis of the
instant court's reliance on the Doe decision. The facts in Doe are clearly
distinguishable from the facts in the instant case." In Doe, the natural
father was financially able to provide the mother with prenatal care.7 z
In the instant case, petitioner had no such financial abilities.73 Reading
the statute in conjunction with Doe, section 63.032(14) prevents a father
who is incapable of paying for health care from being accused of
abandonment.74 Moreover, the fact that petitioner paid half of the
couple's joint living expenses would refute a finding of a lack of
financial support.7

Justice Kogan interpreted the opportunity interest to require a period of time after birth when
a biological father has access to his child. Id. (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 977 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Kogan reasoned
that "hatred of the mother [did] not necessarily imply hatred of the [fetus]." Id. (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
69. Id. (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Kogan feared that the
majority's interpretation of the adoption statute extended state law into the "realm of the
unconstitutional." Id. (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Moreover, Justice Kogan
was unconvinced that a father's pre-birth conduct could ever demonstrate abandonment of the
child. Id. (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Kogan opined that the only
way to make such a demonstration was through clear and convincing evidence that the natural
father expressly abandoned the child, or that he "recklessly or intentionally engaged in conduct
that posed a significant risk of detriment to the fetus." Id. (Kogan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
70. Id. (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 933
(Klein, J., dissenting). Judge Klein emphasized that a father's conduct must be willful in order
to be considered as evidence that he abandoned his child. Id. (Klein, J., dissenting).
71. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 948 app.
72. Doe, 524 So. 2d at 1038.
73. E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 942 app.
74. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 749 (holding "failure of respondent natural father to provide prebirth assistance to the pregnant mother, when he was able, and assistance was needed")
(emphasis added). FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1995) provides in pertinent part: " 'Abandoned'
means ... the parent or legal custodian of a child, while being able, makes no provision for the
child's support ....
Id. (emphasis added).
75. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 941 app. Justice Kogan opined that the majority's finding
reflected an assumption "that an unwed father who lacks [financial] means has fewer rights than
one with money." Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 978 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
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The instant case is also distinguishable from Doe because of the
circumstances surrounding the objection to the adoption.76 The father
in Doe did not object to the adoption until after the child was already
placed in an adoptive home.77 In contrast, petitioner objected to the
adoption before the child was even born.78 While the father's conduct
in Doe was held to be insufficient to satisfy the requirements set out by
Lehr,7 9 petitioner's conduct in the instant case suggests an effort to
assume parental responsibilities. ° Not only did petitioner come forward
by objecting to the adoption, he also paid part of the couple's joint
living expenses, attended a doctor visit with the mother, and purchased
a crib for his child.8" According to the Lehr rationale, such evidence
tends to prove that petitioner was assuming parental
responsibilities and
82
interest.
opportunity
his
exercising
therefore
was
The facts of the instant case further suggest that the courts may have
considered the best interests of the child when deciding this action. 3
As acknowledged by Doe and the instant court, the best interests of a
child should not be considered unless the child is available for adoption.84 Further, a child is not available for adoption unless the court has
determined that the child has been abandoned. With this is mind, the
trial court's reversal of its initial finding of no abandonment is
questionable.86 Upon rehearing, the trial court focused on new evidence
which disclosed that petitioner had a criminal history.87 Yet, this
evidence is not relevant to whether petitioner willfully abandoned his
child.88 Still, after the rehearing focused on this best-interests evidence, 9 the trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence
to reverse its initial decision and conclude that petitioner had abandoned

part). Justice Kogan emphatically stated that poverty could not equate to abandonment under any
standard. Id. (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
76. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 948 (discussing the factual differences of the two cases).

77. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 743.
78. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 965.
79. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 748-49; supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
80. See Baby E.A. W., 658 So. 2d at 977 (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 980-81 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (arguing the court moved away from the
Lehr rationale by shifting the burden of proof to the natural father, forcing him to prove support
rather than requiring those seeking to cut off his rights to prove he did not support the child).
83. E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 945 n.9.
84. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 744; Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966.
85. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966.
86. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 944-45 app.
87. Id. at 945 app.; see supra note 8.
88. E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 945 n.9 app.
89. Id.
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his child.' Because petitioner's criminal past was the focus of the
rehearing, it is reasonable to conclude that such evidence was at least
subconsciously considered by the trial judge.91 While the instant court
declared that evidence regarding petitioner's criminal past was not relied
upon,9" the reversal of the earlier decision raises questions as to
whether the trial court, as well as the instant court, was impermissibly
influenced by this evidence.93
This analysis of the instant facts raises the additional question of
whether the respondents ever presented clear and convincing evidence
that petitioner abandoned his child.9 4 The very nature of the proceedings on appeal sheds doubt upon the instant court's finding that the
evidence was of sufficient weight to satisfy the clear and convincing
evidence standard.95 Given the series of reversals, it would "strain[ ]
reason to conclude that the ... [evidence] was so clear and convincing
as 'to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.' ,,96 Santosky
recognized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the" 'care,
custody, and management of [their] children.' ""9 A failure to adhere
to the clear and convincing evidence standard would undermine the due
process goal announced in Santosky of protecting the liberty interests of
natural parents.9" If, as the instant facts tend to suggest, the evidence
did not satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard, the instant

90. Id. at 945 app.
91. Id. at 945 n.9 app.
92. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 966.
93. See E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 945 n.9 app.
94. See Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 982 (Anstead, J., dissenting). Besides failing to satisfy
the clear and convincing evidence standard, Justice Anstead thought the majority erred by
"applying the concept of abandonment to prebirth situations." Id. at 980 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
Justice Anstead noted that the concept was traditionally limited to "relationships between parents
and their ... existing children." Id. (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 939
(Farmer, J., dissenting) (stating that the evidence presented at trial did not "amount to proof of
anything approaching abandonment"). Judge Farmer noted that evidence cannot satisfy the clear
and convincing evidence standard "when it is consistent with both sides ... of the case." Id.
(Farmer, J., dissenting).
95. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 982 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also E.A.W., 647 So. 2d
at 940 (Farmer, J., dissenting) (noting that the continuation of proceedings on appeal logically
lead to the conclusion that there was not clear and convincing evidence of abandonment). Judge
Farmer maintained that there could not possibly be clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment "unless every judge who reviewed [the case] agreed." Id. (Farmer, J., dissenting).
96. Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 982 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
97. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
98. See id. at 759.
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court's decision, as well as any decision relying on it, could be
construed as a violation of due process.99
While encouraging unwed fathers to take responsibility for their
unborn children is an admirable policy, the instant court's means of
achieving that end are not constitutionally defensible. A man's lack of
interest in the mother of his child, while unfortunate, is not dispositive
of an intention to sever his parental relationship with his unborn child.
If a man wanted to shirk his parental responsibilities, the easiest way to
do so would be to consent to the adoption of his child. Because of the
magnitude of the consequences of the instant court's decision, it is
imperative that Florida law be brought back into the realm of constitutionality. Until this issue is addressed, current state laws will continue
to do children, natural parents, and adoptive parents a grave disservice.

99. See id.; Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d at 980-83 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (discussing the
impact of merely providing "lip service to the clear and convincing standard of proof').
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